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Abstract
Incentive pay systems have been introduced in public sectors such as education and health care. In
these sectors the output (education or health respectively) depends on the actions of different agents
and it is unclear what the effects of such incentive systems are on the behaviour of untargeted agents.
In this study we focus on patient health, modelled as a joint product of patient effort (through lifestyle
and behaviour) and doctor effort (through diagnosis and treatment). Patient response to doctor effort is
shown to be a priori ambiguous and depends on the degree of complementarity or substitution between
doctor and patient effort. We build an empirical model to estimate the effect of doctors’ treatment
effort on patient behaviour. To address the endogeneity of doctor effort we exploit a change in payments
to doctors in the U.K. that led to incentive changes that varied by practice, depending on their prior
performance levels. We use panel data on the physical activity, drinking and smoking behaviours of over
2,000 cardiovascular disease patients aged over 50 in England and link these data to their primary care
practice performance data. Our results indicate that primary care practices increased the proportion of
patients with controlled disease from 76% to 83% in response to the payment change. Patients responded
by reducing the frequency of drinking alcohol and their cigarette consumption, suggesting that patient
efforts are complements to doctor effort. Understanding such complementarities has implications for
assessing the design and effectiveness of pay-for-performance schemes which encourage higher doctor
effort.
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1 Introduction
The use of performance incentives are common in the private sector, but recently explicit incentive
contracts have been adopted in public sectors such as education and health care to name a few (Lavy
(2009); Propper et al. (2010); Propper and Wilson (2012)). Most research in this area has investigated
the incentive effects on targeted agents (Prendergast (1999)) or teams (Burgess et al. (2010)). However, in
complex organisations agents interact with each other and we might expect the incentive effects on targeted
agents to be complemented or substituted by the actions of untargeted agents. One example of such complex
organisations are schools where there are multiple stakeholders, teams and tasks. The outcome, education,
is a joint product of teacher effort, through teaching style and lecture content, and pupil effort, through
homework completion and participation in classes. In this context, incentives that aim to improve teacher
performance may be enhanced by pupils’ complementary actions. Some studies have found that performance
pay may actually reduce pupil GPA and daily attendance rates, especially when performance pay is related
to pupil feedback (Elberts et al. (2002)). Others have found a positive association between teacher incentives
and pupil performance (Glewwe et al. (2010); Lavy (2009)), but were unable to determine whether this was
due to better schools selecting into incentive pay systems or teacher incentives exerting more effort from
teachers (Figlio and Kenny (2007)).
This study focuses on health, that, like education, is a joint product between two agents. In this case the
agents are doctors and patients, where doctors provide medical treatment and patients choose their lifestyle
behaviours. Our contribution is to investigate whether patient effort is complementary to doctor effort using
an arguably-exogenous variation in doctor effort generated by the largest pay for performance incentive for
English primary care practices, the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF). There is very little evidence
on how the QOF has affected patients, particularly with respect to their health behaviours and their health
outcomes (Gillam et al. (2012); Sutton et al. (2010)). To motivate our empirical analysis, we first provide
a stylised model of a patient-doctor interaction. We show that patient’s response to doctor’s effort depends
on the degree of complementarity and substitution between doctor and patient efforts. We then investigate
doctor response to a change in the payment rule. Whereas doctors always increase their effort in response
to a price increase, patient response depends on the degree of complementarity or substitution between her
effort and doctor effort. This has wider implications for the effectiveness of schemes which encourage doctor’s
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effort. If patient and doctor efforts are complements then by incentivising doctor’s effort the purchaser also
incentivises patient’s effort. In this case, incentive based schemes will have additional value to the one that
might have been expected ex ante.
We estimate this potential complementarity between doctor and patient actions specifically in the con-
text of patients with cardiovascular disease in England. This is an area of health care where best practice
management and prevention recommends a combination of medical treatment and behaviour change inter-
ventions, through reduction of smoking and drinking, and increase in physical activity (NICE (2009); NICE
(2014); NICE (2015)) and where a new strategy encouraging people to engage in their own health and health
care was recently introduced (Wanless (2002) and the Department of Health (2013)). To estimate our model
we use a large sample of individuals diagnosed with cardiovascular diseases (CVDs) from the English Lon-
gitudinal Survey of Ageing (ELSA) between 2004 and 2006 and implement a new linkage between ELSA
respondents and administrative data on primary care practice treatment rates.
One clear difficulty in estimating the effect of doctor behaviour on patients actions is the potential endo-
geneity of the doctor’s decision. We address this issue by means of a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach
in which doctor’s effort is instrumented with the potential change in revenue induced by changes in a large
pay-for-performance (P4P) scheme, the QOF. This incentive system was introduced in the U.K. in 2004 to
reward primary care practices for providing high-quality care (relative to pre-defined thresholds) in a num-
ber of disease areas. Specifically, our identification exploits the fact that between 2004 and 2006 primary
care practices faced different price incentives from the QOF, depending on their initial level of performance
in 2004. We use this change in price schedule to determine the (practice-specific) financial incentive that
was generated by the QOF and we use this variation as an instrument for doctor effort. Our identifying
assumption is that the potential change in revenue induced by changes in the QOF prices is independent of
subsequent changes in all individual patient lifestyle determinants and changes in aggregate practice perfor-
mance, conditional on a rich set of patient characteristics and practice-level area-based deprivation measures.
We provide evidence in support of our identification strategy and subject our estimation to a battery of sen-
sitivity analyses including a larger set of performance indicators and falsification tests that use unrelated
outcomes, patient groups and indicators.
Our key finding is that patient’s effort is complementary to doctor’s effort in some important dimensions.
Higher doctor disease control reduces alcohol and cigarette consumption, although no effect is found for
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physical activity. The results may be explained by alcohol and cigarette consumption being more observable
to the doctor and likely to generate the highest health benefits to the patient. The quantitative effect
corresponds to 7-12% of the sample mean of cigarette smoking. An average practice which increases its rate
of disease control from 76% to 83% triggers a reduction in cigarette consumption by 1-1.7 per day per smoker
and a reduction in patient’s frequency of alcohol drinking by 0.05 points (about 2% of the sample mean),
though the latter is only statistically significant at 10% level.
In terms of the design of incentive schemes, the policy implication of our study is that the optimal
price per unit of doctor effort is higher in the presence of complementarities with patient effort since there
are larger benefits from incentivising doctor effort. In other words, interactions between agents make the
incentive scheme higher powered.
Our study relates to two distinct strands of the health care literature, one examining the determinants of
health behaviours and the other investigating the effect of price shocks on the quality of health care. Most
directly, we add to the body of studies that have analysed the determinants of health behaviours (see Cawley
and Ruhm (2011) for a review) and have also focused on the potential complementarity or substitutability
between these behaviours and health care arrangements. These studies are grounded in economic models by
Ehrlich and Becker (1972) and Peltzman (1975) where “state investments” that provide an insurance role
against the magnitude of negative effects of diseases and a protection role against the probability that such
diseases occur, may be complemented or substituted by “self-investments”.
A first group of such studies examine changes in medical treatment to determine its effects on health
behaviours (Bennett (2012); Slade (2012); Fichera and Sutton (2011); Fichera et al. (2016); Kaestner et
al. (2014); Wilson et al. (2014)). For instance, Slade (2012) used nine waves of the Health and Retirement
Study (HRS) to examine the relation between medication and the lifestyle behaviours of diabetics and found
improvements in health behaviours, but only in the short-term. In order to address potential selection bias,
Slade (2012) compared diabetic to pre-diabetic patients (i.e. those who have impaired glucose metabolism)
using HRS biomarker data. Fichera and Sutton (2011) used three cross-sections of the Health Survey for
England (HSE) to determine the effect of lipid-lowering drugs and smoking cessation advice on quitting
smoking behaviour. In a trivariate probit regression they adopted an exclusion restriction involving the
individuals’ level of cholesterol and type of heart disease. They found evidence that doctors use medical
treatment to compensate for patients’ unobserved propensity to quit smoking. Using the same data, Fichera
4
et al. (2016) found that the sharp increase in the supply of medical treatment induced by the introduction
of the QOF was associated with a reduction in cigarette consumption amongst individuals with targeted
conditions. Kaestner et al. (2014) used the gradual penetration of statins in the U.S. market since their
introduction in 1987 as an instrument for statin use. They found that an increase in statins was associated
with a 0.3-0.5 point increase in BMI for females and males and an increase of 15% of the mean in moderate
alcohol consumption by males. Their results provide evidence for a strong substitutability of healthier
behaviours and health care. However, they found no consistent evidence of a decrease in smoking as a result
of statin use.
A second group of studies exploits price shocks induced by insurance to determine whether individuals
complement or substitute cheaper health care with healthier lifestyle behaviours (Dave and Kaestner (2009);
de Preux (2011); Spenkuch (2012); Yilma et al. (2012); Lakdawalla et al. (2006); Bhattacharya et al.
(2011)). For instance, Dave and Kaestner (2009) used the HRS data and compared uninsured with insured
(for whom the price of health care is lower) pre-65 year-olds with a difference-in-differences method. They
found statistically weak evidence of substitution for some lifestyle factors (i.e. physical exercise, quit smoking
and alcohol consumption) but only for males. de Preux (2011) used the same data with a double robust
difference-in-differences estimation to examine if individuals engage in unhealthier lifestyle behaviours in
anticipation of insurance eligibility. She found evidence of a ten-percentage point reduction in physical
activity but no effect on smoking or alcohol drinking. Lakdawalla et al. (2006) showed that breakthroughs in
HIV treatment coupled with cheaper access to medical technologies increases HIV-infections. This happens
because HIV+ patients who get treatment in U.S. states with more generous Medicaid eligibility rules are
more likely to engage in risky sexual behaviours.
In addition to not modelling the links between doctor and patient effort, these studies are empirical
studies where identification hinges on the plausibility of their exclusion restrictions or comparison groups.
The identification strategy adopted by Fichera and Sutton (2011) is based on an essentially untestable but
plausible assumption of no direct effect of the severity of CVD on smoking behaviour. Fichera et al. (2016)
assume that individuals on either side of the QOF-induced discontinuity are similar in their unobserved
propensity to engage in healthier lifestyle behaviours. Dave and Kaestner (2009) assume that insured and
uninsured do not differ in their unobservable characteristics.
Since our 2SLS strategy requires us to model doctor effort as well as patient behaviour, our study also
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contributes directly to the literature on the effect of price shocks on the quality of health care and on the
effort of doctors. Some of these studies investigate the effect of price changes on the quality of care provided
by hospitals finding an increase in incentivised procedures, a reduction in long stays and an increase in the
number of patients treated (see for example, Allen et al. (2016) and Januleviciute et al. (2016)) but no effect
on mortality (Seshamani et al. (2006)), volume of admissions or intensity of care (Dafny (2005)). Several
studies examine the effect of price changes induced by financial incentives on the quality of primary health
care (see for example the systematic reviews by Scott et al. (2011) and Gillam et al. (2012)) and on the effort
of doctors (Flodgren et al. (2011); Gravelle et al. (2010); Sutton et al. (2010)). With regards to the QOF,
the P4P scheme we examine in this paper, most studies have found an improvement in the quality of care
for the incentivised areas in the first few years following its introduction after which performance reached
a plateau. Sutton et al. (2010) found evidence of substantial increases in the recording of the incentivised
risk factors when the QOF was introduced and positive spillovers onto the recording of unincentivised risk
factors (such as alcohol consumption and BMI) for patients with the targeted conditions.
In the next section we provide a simple theoretical motivation for our empirical analysis. Section 3
describes the data sets. The empirical strategy and results are outlined in section 4. Section 5 and 6
describe the robustness checks and mechanisms, respectively. Section 7 concludes.
2 A model of doctor and patient behaviour
We provide a stylised model of a doctor providing medical treatment and diagnosis (doctor effort), and
the patient choosing her lifestyle behaviours (patient effort). We assume that the representative patient has
been diagnosed with CVD and has already made the choice of visiting the doctor (therefore abstracting from
modelling her participation decision).
The patient has two possible health states, Hs, after treatment is received: either the patient is healthier,
s = 1 or not, s = 0 with H1 > H0. There is uncertainty in the effectiveness of medical treatment. A better
health state is realised with probability ϕ ∈ (0, 1).
Patients’ utility in state s is equal to U(Hs, Is), where Is = I(Hs)− τ denotes patient’s gross income and
τ a tax used to finance health care. Utility is increasing in both health and income, and concave in both
arguments, UH > 0, UI > 0, UHH < 0 and UII < 0. For simplicity we assume that utility is separable in
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health and income, and UHI = 0. We therefore assume that health affects utility both directly and indirectly
through its effect on income I, and health is both a consumption and an investment good, which is consistent
with the Grossman (1972) model. Patients are risk-averse.
Critically, we assume that the probability of being healthier ϕ(y, a), which is a key determinant of the
health production function, depends on patient’s lifestyle behaviours (patient effort), y, and medical treatment
or advice supplied by the doctor (doctor effort), a, with ϕy > 0, ϕa > 0, ϕyy < 0 and ϕaa < 0. Both increase
the probability of a good state at a decreasing rate. Patient effort and doctor effort are observable and can
be either complements or substitutes in the probability of being healthy.
The function ϕ(y, a) gives the production function through which different efforts translate into a different
probability of falling ill. Complementarity (ϕya > 0) occurs when patients’ healthier lifestyles increase the
effectiveness of doctors’ medical effort. If the patient has a healthier lifestyle (an increase in y), an increase
in doctor’s effort a becomes more effective in improving the health of the patient. Substitutability (ϕya < 0)
occurs when patients’ lifestyles make doctors’ medical effort less effective or productive. Therefore, the
function ϕ(y, a) can be interpreted as the technology through which different efforts translate into the
probability of being healthy.
As an illustrative example, consider the prescription of lipid lowering drugs to a CVD patient. If the
patient has better lifestyle behaviours (i.e. less drinking, smoking, better diet and more physical activity)
the effect of the drug in reducing the probability of falling ill can be higher (because the treatment is more
effective in patients who do not smoke or drink) or it might be lower (if a higher health makes it more
difficult to achieve further health gains).
Patient non-monetary costs from healthier lifestyle behaviours are g(y) with gy > 0 and gyy > 0.
1 These
might include time costs to engage in physical activity or to cook at home.
We assume that patient’s lifestyle and doctor’s efforts are chosen simultaneously and we interpret this
as the outcome of a long-run relationship between the patient and the doctor (which seems plausible for
patients with chronic conditions where patient and doctor know each other well). We first derive the optimal
level of patient effort for a given doctor effort. Second, we derive the optimal doctor effort for a given patient
effort. Third, we derive the simultaneously determined doctor and patient effort.
1We could model such costs as monetary. This would make the presentation more cumbersome but would not alter the key
insights of the model. The marginal cost would now be the expected marginal cost across health states.
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Patient’s expected utility is:
EU(y, a) = ϕ(y, a)U(H1, I1) + [1− ϕ(y, a)]U(H0, I0)− g(y). (1)
For a given level of doctor’s effort a, patient’s optimal lifestyle y∗(a) satisfies the following First Order
Condition:
EUy(y
∗, a) ≡ ϕy(y∗, a)× [U(H1, I1)− U(H0, I0)]− gy(y∗) = 0. (2)
The marginal benefit from higher health is equal to the marginal cost of lifestyle behaviours. The Second
Order Condition is: EUyy = ϕyy [U(H1, I1)− U(H0, I0)]− gyy < 0, which is always satisfied.
The patient response to higher doctor’s effort depends on the degree of complementarity and substitution
of doctor’s and patient’s efforts into the health production function. Analytically:
dy∗
da
= −EUya(y
∗, a)
EUyy(y∗, a)
= −ϕya(y∗, a)U(H1, I1)− U(H0, I0)
EUyy(y∗, a)
. (3)
The doctor is assumed to be risk-neutral, and her expected utility depends on income and the medical
treatment she provides. In addition to a fixed payment ω > 0, she receives a linear performance payment
R(a) = p(a−aL) conditional on performance being above a lower threshold aL and below a higher threshold
aU , i.e. aL ≤ a ≤ aU .2 The performance payment is instead zero, i.e. R(a) = 0, if performance is below the
lower threshold, i.e. a < aL. The performance payment is R(a) = p(aU − aL) if performance is above the
upper threshold, i.e. a > aU .
The cost of providing medical treatment is c(a) with ca > 0 and caa > 0. We assume the doctor is
altruistic and that α ∈ [0, 1] proxies the degree of doctor’s altruism in relation to patient’s health (as in Ellis
and McGuire (1986)).
For performance values which are above the lower threshold and below the higher threshold, the doctor’s
expected utility is equal to:
EW (y, a) = ω + p(a− aL) + α[ϕ(y, a)H1 + (1− ϕ(y, a))H0]− c(a) (4)
2In reality, doctors’ remuneration is more complex and depends on their contractual arrangement (i.e. partner or salaried
doctor) and on how the QOF income is split within the practice (see for example Gravelle et al. (2010)). This simplification
is appropriate for our empirical analysis. Moreover, primary care doctors have also a lower threshold below which they do not
receive additional revenues. In our empirical sample hardly any GP practice is below the minimum threshold, and therefore
this simplification has no implications for our empirical analysis.
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For a given level of patient lifestyle behaviours, the optimal level of doctor’s effort a∗(y) satisfies the following
First Order Condition:
EWa(y, a
∗) ≡ p+ αϕa(y, a∗)× (H1 −H0)− ca(a∗) = 0. (5)
The marginal monetary and non-monetary benefit from higher doctor’s effort is equal to its marginal cost.
The Second Order Condition is EWaa = αϕaa(H1−H0)−caa < 0. If the doctor has strictly positive altruism,
the doctor responds to an increase in patient lifestyle behaviours by increasing or reducing effort depending
on their degree of complementarity or substitution into the health production function. Analytically,
da∗
dy
= −EWay(y, a
∗)
EWaa(y, a∗)
= −αϕya(y, a∗)× H1 −H0
EWaa(y, a∗)
. (6)
The equilibrium is denoted by the pair (y∗, a∗), where we assume that aL ≤ a∗ ≤ aU , and simultaneously
satisfies respectively the first order condition of the patient and the doctor:
EUy(y
∗, a∗) = 0, (7)
EWa(y
∗, a∗) = 0. (8)
In section 2.1, we conduct comparative statics with respect to the change in price p. In section 2.2, we
introduce provider heterogeneity, which allows us to investigate a change in the upper threshold. Both these
changes are relevant for our empirical analysis.
2.1 Comparative statics with respect to price
Applying Cramer’s rule, we obtain the optimal response of doctor’s and patient’s effort to a price change:
da∗
dp
= −EUyy(y
∗, a∗)
∆
> 0, (9)
dy∗
dp
=
EUya(y
∗, a∗)
∆
= ϕya(y
∗, a∗)× U(H1, I1)− U(H0, I0)
∆
, (10)
where
∆ := [EUyy(y
∗, a∗)× EUaa(y∗, a∗)]− [EUya(y∗, a∗)× EWay(y∗, a∗)] (11)
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and ∆ > 0 is satisfied under minimal regularity conditions. The results are intuitive. The doctor responds
to an increase in price by always increasing effort or medical treatment. Whether the patient responds by
increasing or reducing effort depends on whether patient’s and doctor’s effort are respectively complements
or substitutes.
2.2 Comparative statics with respect to the upper threshold
We now assume that providers are heterogeneous and differ in the degree of altruism α ∈ [α, α], which
is uniformly distributed with a density function equal to one. We assume that the provider with lowest
altruism has a level of effort which is above the lowest threshold, so that a(α) > aL. This assumption is
consistent with the data used in our empirical analysis, and allows us to focus on the effect of changing the
upper threshold.
Since we are interested in the effect of varying the upper threshold, provider heterogeneity is required
so that some providers are above the upper threshold aU and others are below. Define a
∗∗ the equilibrium
doctor effort in the absence of the price, i.e. p = 0 (and y∗∗ as equilibrium patient effort):
EWa(y
∗∗, a∗∗) ≡ αϕa(y∗∗, a∗∗)× (H1 −H0)− ca(a∗∗) = 0. (12)
Moreover, define αU as the level of altruism such that optimal provider effort when the price is positive
is equal to the upper threshold, a∗(αU ) = aU ; and define αU as the level of altruism such that the optimal
provider effort when the price is zero is equal to the upper threshold, a∗∗(αU ) = aU , where αU > αU . Then,
the following result holds:
Proposition 1. If α ∈ [α, αU ), provider effort is equal to a∗(α); if α ∈ [αU , αU ], provider effort is equal
to the upper threshold aU ; and if α ∈ (αU , α] then provider effort is equal to a∗∗(α).
The proof is in Appendix A. Figure 1 illustrates. Providers with relatively low altruism, i.e. α ∈ [α, αU ),
are motivated by the positive price incentive to provide the higher level of effort a∗(α), relative to the lower
effort a∗∗(α) when the price is absent. Providers with intermediate levels of altruism, i.e. α ∈ [αU , αU ],
bunch at the upper performance threshold aU : the price incentive is strong enough to induce them to provide
effort at the upper threshold but no more. Providers with highest altruism, i.e. α ∈ (αU , α], have incentive
to provide effort above the upper threshold despite the lack of the price incentive due to their altruistic
10
concern.
Figure 2 illustrates the change of an increase in the upper threshold aU . Analytically, both αU and αU
increase (as dαU/daU = 1/(∂a
∗/∂α) > 0 and dαU/daU = 1/(∂a∗∗/∂α) > 0). Providers who, before the
change, were bunching at the old upper threshold now increase their effort to a level strictly above the old
threshold (and either below or at the new upper threshold). Following the increase in the threshold, more
providers respond to the price since additional activity is rewarded with additional revenues. Moreover,
providers now bunch at a higher level of performance.
Figure 3 illustrates the case of a simultaneous increase in the price p and the upper threshold aU . The
effect is similar to Figure 2, but in addition providers with low altruism also increase the effort.
2.3 The purchaser of health services
We assume that the purchaser of health services maximises patient expected utility EU(y, a) and medical
care is financed through the tax τ , subject to the participation constraint of the provider:
EW (y, a) ≥ 0, (13)
and a limited liability constraint of the provider:
ω + p(a− aU )− c(a) ≥ 0. (14)
The latter ensures that the doctor does not make a negative profit. In the presence of altruism, the
participation constraint is always satisfied when the limited liability constraint is satisfied, i.e. when
ω + p(a − aU ) = c(a). We therefore set the tax equal to the minimum transfer necessary to satisfy such
constraint: τ = c(a), which susbstituted in patient’s utility gives:
EU(y, a) = ϕ(y, a)U(H1, I(H1)− c(a)) + [1− ϕ(y, a)]U(H0, I(H0)− c(a))− g(y). (15)
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The level of patient’s and doctor’s efforts which maximise patient expected utility, denoted with yf and af ,
are given by:
EUy(y
f , af ) ≡ ϕy(yf , af )×∆U(af )− gy(yf ) = 0, (16)
EWa(y
f , af ) ≡ ϕa(yf , af )×∆U(af )− EUI(yf , af )ca(af ) = 0, (17)
where
∆U(af ) := [U(H1, I(H1)− c(af ))− U(H0, I(H0 − c(af ))], (18)
is the gain from being in a better health state evaluated at doctor’s optimal effort, and
EUI(y
f , af ) :=
{
ϕ(yf , af )UI(H1, I(H1)− c(af )) + [1− ϕ(yf , af )]UI(H0, I(H0)− c(af ))
}
(19)
is the expected marginal utility of income across the two health states evaluated at optimal efforts.
The optimality condition for the patient is analogous to the one derived above and requires no further
comments. The optimal level of doctor’s effort is such that the marginal health gain is equal to the marginal
cost of medical treatment weighted by the expected marginal utility of income.
Comparing the optimality condition of doctor’s effort under a pay-for-performance incentive scheme,
EWa(y, a
∗) ≡ p+ αϕa(y, a∗)× (H1 −H0)− ca(a∗) = 0, (20)
with the one desired by the purchaser of health services, we obtain the price level which implements the
optimal patient’s and doctor’s effort:
pf = ϕa(y
f , af )× [∆U(af )− α(H1 −H0)]+ ca(af )× {1− EUI(yf , af )} . (21)
The condition suggests that the purchaser sets the price equal to the marginal utility gain from higher
medical treatment (first term in the square bracket). If the doctor is altruistic, then the purchaser needs to
motivate the provider less, and this tends to reduce the price (second term in the square bracket). Finally,
if the patient and the doctor differ in the marginal utility of income, an additional adjustment is made.
For example, suppose that the marginal utility of income is higher for the patient in equilibrium. Then the
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marginal cost taken into account by the doctor is lower than the one of the patient, and the optimal amount
of medical care and the corresponding price is also lower (third term).
The optimal price depends on the degree of complemetarity or substitution in doctor and patient effort,
i.e. on ϕay. If patient and doctor efforts are complements then the optimal price is higher: by incentivising
doctor effort, the purchaser also incentivises patient effort. The opposite holds when efforts are substitutes.
The benefit from incentivising doctor effort is crowded out by the reduction in patient effort.
The optimal pricing rule highlights that the estimation of the degree of complementarity or substitution
in doctor and patient effort can help design policies aimed at incentivising doctors.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Examining the patient-doctor interaction requires data on these agents’ efforts. We therefore link two
data sources: the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) and the National Health Service Quality
Management and Analysis System (QMAS) database. In this section we describe each data source in turn
and provide some simple descriptive statistics of our sample before discussing the way in which we utilise
information on doctor payment incentives.
3.1 English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA)
The English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) is a biannual survey and the first study in the U.K.
to include a range of topics necessary to understand the economic, social, psychological and health elements
of the ageing process. Our analysis uses waves 2 and 3 of ELSA corresponding to years 2004 and 2006,
respectively, since they cover a period over which an exogenous change in doctor remuneration has occurred.
ELSA is designed to be a representative sample of those aged 50 or over and living in private households
in England. For the purpose of our analysis we use data from the “core” ELSA interview questionnaires
on diagnosis of diseases, health behaviours, demographic characteristics, and wealth. We match over 7,000
individuals in 2004 and over 6,000 in 2006 to the primary care practices they are registered with (more details
on the matching are described in sub-section 3.2). ELSA participants were asked whether they have been
diagnosed by a doctor with one of the following conditions: diabetes, high blood pressure (hypertension),
angina, heart attack, heart failure, heart murmur, irregular heart rhythm and other heart problems. We
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choose this subset of conditions because they are covered by the payment change that we consider for doctor
performance and involve a large number of patients. In order to avoid picking up changes in CVD diagnosis
due to the change in the payment incentive, we select individuals who reported CVD in the 2004 wave
of ELSA (i.e. the first year the payment incentive was introduced). From this sample, we obtain 3,300
individuals with CVD who are observed both in 2004 and 2006.
We consider a number of socioeconomic characteristics including household size, and whether the respon-
dent is married or cohabiting as opposed to being divorced or separated, widowed or never married. We also
consider whether the respondent is employed or self-employed as opposed to unemployed, disabled, looking
after home or family or retired. We use total wealth to measure socio-economic status since it has a higher
correlation with health than income in older populations (see Demakakos et al. (2008)). Total (non-pension)
wealth is defined as the sum of financial wealth, physical wealth and housing wealth after deducting debts.
This variable is measured in pounds sterling and deflated by the Consumer Price Index with 2005 as the
base year.
As lifestyle behaviours we consider physical activity, smoking and drinking behaviour because they are
measured in both the 2004 and 2006 waves. All lifestyle behaviours have been coded to be increasing in
health effort. We use a measure of physical activity which is self-reported and categorised as follows: 1
(none) - not working or sedentary occupation, or engages in only mild exercise; 2 (low) - working in a job
that involves standing and/or engaging in moderate activity; 3 (moderate) - working in a job involving
physical work and/or engaging in vigorous activity once a week to 1-3 times a month; 4 (high) - engaged
in heavy manual work and/or doing vigorous leisure activity more than once a week. In each wave of the
survey respondents are asked the number of cigarettes smoked on a weekday or weekend. We calculate a
weighted average of the two to determine the average number of cigarettes smoked per day. We recode it
to be negative in order to indicate a lifestyle behaviour increasing in health effort. Alcohol consumption is
defined as frequency of consumption in the past year. It is categorised as follows: 1=Daily; 2=Frequently:
once per week or more; 3=Rarely: once/twice per week or once every two months; 4=Never.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for 2,249 CVD patients (top panel) of which 238 are smokers (bottom
panel). The sample of CVD patients used in the analysis is smaller than the total sample of individuals
with CVD because of missing values in individual characteristics. The distribution of physical activity shifts
towards lower intensity from 2004 to 2006. The proportion of people drinking either daily or frequently
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decreases from 2004 to 2006. There is also a reduction in the average number of cigarettes per day from 14
in 2004 to 12 in 2006. We note that the balanced sample may suffer from attrition bias. However, comparing
the individual characteristics and behaviours of the balanced sample with the unbalanced sample we find
little difference between the two (available from the authors on request).
3.2 The Quality Management and Analysis System database
The data on quality of care for over 8,000 primary care practices in England is stored in the National
Health Service Quality Management and Analysis System (QMAS) database3. We use this database to
obtain the codes and addresses of all practices in England. We describe here how we matched this data to
the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). More details are available in Appendix C.
As part of the nurse visits carried out in 2004 and 2008, ELSA respondents were asked the name and
address of their doctor. The initial sample of ELSA respondents for whom we had some information on the
primary care practice they were registered with was 7,332 in 2004 and 8,138 in 2008 (as these were the years
when nurse visits were carried out). After a two-stage imputation process, we have successfully matched to
practices about 82% and 80% of the sample of initial ELSA respondents in 2004 and 2008. Of the 9,168
individuals who did not move between 2004 and 2008 we successfully matched about 73% to practices in 2006.
The majority of these respondents were uniquely matched to practices but due to incomplete postcode or
address information, there were multiple potential matches for about 6% and 5% of respondents in 2004 and
2008 respectively. In this case we use information from all the potential practices, constructing a sampling
weight that equals the share of registered patients (i.e. practice j’s list size) that respondent i’s matched
practice represents to the total list size of all the matched practices. This share is equal to one if respondent
i is uniquely matched to practice j and it is less than one if she is matched to multiple practices4.
The geographical coverage of ELSA is good. ELSA contains at least one person registered with 32% and
31% of all practices in England in 2004 and 2006, respectively. Practices are grouped geographically into
151 Primary Care Trusts. ELSA contains at least one person from each of the 151 Primary Care Trusts.
Having linked ELSA respondents to their doctor practices we are in a position to bring in information
on the characteristics and performance of that practice and the behaviours of the doctors within it. General
3The data is freely available at: https://qof.digital.nhs.uk.
4Our results are unaffected by the inclusion of multiple matches. More details on the data matching process can be made
available to the reader upon request.
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practices in the U.K. are a group of one to six doctors responsible for a pool of patients. We measure their
deprivation by the Low Income Scheme Index (LISI), a measure of practice list deprivation from prescription
data. It indicates the proportion of prescribing expenditure that was dispensed to people exempt from
prescription charges on grounds of low income. We measure the performance of the practice by the Quality
and Outcomes Framework (QOF) which determines about 20% of each doctor’s income. We use QOF data
at the practice level to obtain proxies for doctors’ effort and to measure the exogenous change in their
remuneration.
The QOF was officially introduced on 1st April 2004 with the first measurement of performance taking
place on 31st March 2005. Practices are rewarded on the basis of their performance on a number of indicators.
These indicators cover how well the practice is organised and the quality of clinical care that the practice
provides to its patients. The assessment of the quality of clinical care focuses on the practice’s measurement
of risk factors, delivery of appropriate treatments and success in keeping the levels of risk factors under
control.
The practice’s “achievement”, a ∈ [0, 100]5, is measured by the proportion of eligible patients who meet
the quality indicator. Practices are awarded points based on these levels of achievement. Lower and upper
thresholds for achievement are specified for each indicator. No points are awarded if the practice’s level
of achievement is less than or equal to the lower threshold. Maximum points are awarded if the practice’s
level of achievement is on or above the upper threshold (see Gravelle et al. (2010); Doran et al. (2011)
for further details). The number of points awarded to the practice for their achievement on each indicator
varies linearly between the lower and upper thresholds. The payment schedule is therefore piece-wise linear,
with flat segments below the lower threshold and above the upper threshold, and a constant per-unit price
in-between.
Practices are paid on the basis of the number of points they are awarded. More points are on offer for
activities that require more effort. Levels of payment per point are adjusted for case-mix, such that practices
with more eligible patients receive a higher level of payment per point awarded (Guthrie et al. (2006)).
Since the QOF was introduced, the levels of the lower and upper thresholds and the maximum points
that are available for particular indicators have been amended to stimulate better performance. To capture
the change in incentive for doctor’s effort, we focus on the four CVD indicators for which there was a change
5Note that a indicates the average doctor’s effort in a practice as described in section 2.
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in the threshold levels and/or in the maximum number of points available between 2004 and 2006. Table 2
reports a description of these four indicators. There were increases in the lower thresholds from 25% to 40%
for all indicators. There were increases of either 5 or 10 percentage points in the upper thresholds. There
were increases in the maximum number of points available for two of the indicators and in the price per point
between 2004 and 2006. We illustrate the marginal revenue function arising from changes in achievement
thresholds and prices in Figure 4. The practice marginal revenue function increases for achievement rates
between the new lower and upper thresholds in 2006.
We then aggregate these four indicators into a Disease Control indicator accounting for 50 and 52 points,
respectively in 2004 and 20066. Disease Control indicates whether cholesterol and blood pressure are under
the recommended levels.
We weight the achievement rates for disease control by the proportion of total points available for each
of the four indicators and we report them in Table 3. The points weighted average achievement rates of an
average practice is 76% and 83% in 2004 and 2006, respectively. As the national average price per point in
2004 was £75, increasing to £126 by 2006, an average practice could earn up to £2, 850 in 2004 and up to
£5, 438 in 2006 for its effort in controlling CVD.
We define the potential change in revenue as the change in performance payments for doctor’s effort,
with her effort fixed at the 2004 level. Formally for each indicator ι, R04ι (a
04, a04L , a
04
U )−R04ι (a04, a06L , a06U ) =
min
{
1,max
{
(a04−a04L )
(a04U −a04L )
, 0
}}
−min
{
1,max
{
(a04−a06L )
(a06U −a06L )
, 0
}}
. R represents the revenue for disease control in
which each indicator is weighted by the price per point and the proportion of total points available, ptι∗ pi
t
ι
p¯it . So,
∆R = { [
∑k
ι=1
p04ι ∗pi04ι ∗R04ι (p04,a04,a04L ,a04U )]
p¯i04 }−{
[
∑k
ι=1
p06ι ∗pi06ι ∗R04ι (p06,a04,a06L ,a06U )]
p¯i06 }. Intuitively, ∆R is the difference
between doctor’s remuneration in 2004 (evaluated at 2004 prices, points and thresholds) for her level of effort
in 2004 and the hypothetical doctor’s remuneration in 2004 (evaluated at 2006 prices, points and thresholds)
for her level of effort in 2004. As an illustrative example, assume that practice j’s achievement in indicator
CHD8 in 2004 is a04 = 65. In other words, 65% of patients with CHD have had a measurement of cholesterol
below 7mmol/l. This value is above 2004 upper threshold but below 2006 upper threshold. Following Table 2,
R04ι (a
04, a04L , a
04
U ) = p
04 ∗1∗16 and R04ι (a04, a06L , a06U ) ≡ p06 ∗ 65−4070−40 = p06 ∗0.833∗17. Therefore, the potential
change in revenue weighted by the number of points for CHD8 is ∆Rι = p
04 ∗ (16 ∗ 1)− p06 ∗ (17 ∗ 0.83) =
6We aggregate them because they are highly correlated to each other where the correlation coefficient ranges between 0.3
and 0.6.
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(p04 ∗ 16)− (p06 ∗ 14.11)7.
We calculate this change in revenue for each indicator within disease control and we weight it by the
proportion of total points available for disease control. This change in revenue will be positive and vary
between zero and one. A graphical representation of this potential change in revenue aggregated for all four
Disease Control indicators is provided in Figure 5. This is different from the marginal revenue function
depicted in Figure 4 because Figure 5 represents the potential change in revenue that would arise if doctors
performed as well in 2006 as they did in 2004, it does not represent what the actual change in revenue was.
On the horizontal axis of Figure 5, we report the proportion of patients to whom the indicator applies -
the achievement rate at with t = 2004, 2006. This is indexed with ‘L’ or ‘U’ indicating lower and upper
thresholds of achievement, respectively. On the vertical axis, we report the potential change in revenue
between 2006 and 2004, ∆R. This potential change in revenue is zero for practices with achievement below
the 2004 lower threshold because they will not be remunerated for this level of performance either in 2004 or
in 20068. If the achievement rate is between 2004 and 2006 lower thresholds, the potential change in revenue
is positive because with the new payment function practices would need to perform better in 2006 compared
to 2004 in order to avoid a loss. The potential change in revenue then becomes progressively smaller for rates
of achievement between 2006 lower threshold and 2004 upper threshold. This potential change in revenue
becomes even smaller for some rates of achievement between 2004 and 2006 upper thresholds because of the
change in the maximum available points. It then becomes zero if the rate of achievement is above the 2006
upper threshold because practices achieve the maximum points both in 2004 and in 2006.
The potential change in revenue reported in Table 3 is on average positive as practices could avoid a loss
in revenue in 2006 compared to 2004 if they increased their performance. On average, practices would avoid
losing around 5% of the available payment, and they could avoid losing as much as 39% if, maintaining 2004
performance in 2006, they were above the 2006 lower payment threshold.
In order to examine the representativeness of our sample of practices, we compare the practices in ELSA
to the full sample of practices in England. In Table B.1 we report the number of practices in England (left
panel) and those in the ELSA sample (right panel) with an achievement rate which is: i) below the lower
7In monetary terms, with the price per point for a practice with average case-mix changing from p04=£75 in 2004 to
p06=£126 in 2006, a practice with average case-mix would lose £578 on indicator CHD8. As the increase in price per point is
common across all indicators, we do not monetarise the potential revenue in the regression models and we express the incentive
as indicated in Table 2 and the example above, but without pt.
8Note that in our data we do not have practices below the lower threshold in 2006.
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threshold, ii) between the lower and the upper threshold, and iii) above the upper threshold in 2004 and in
2006, respectively. The proportion of practices linked to respondents in ELSA that fall in each threshold
interval is very similar to that of England. In Table B.2 we report the points weighted average achievement
rates and the potential change in revenue of the full sample of English practices. Our sample of practices in
ELSA adequately represents that of England: the mean and minimum values, and the standard deviation of
the potential change in revenue in the last row of Table 3 do not differ much from those in Table B.2.
4 Empirical Strategy and Results
4.1 OLS models
The main aim of the empirical analysis is to estimate patient’s response to doctor’s effort as defined by
Eq. (1) and the comparative statics described by Eq. (10). In order to do so, we first consider a linear model
for each lifestyle behaviour of patient i registered with practice j in year t = 2004; 2006:
yijt = β0xijt + γ0ajt + cij + ijt (22)
where yijt indicates the lifestyle behaviours, xijt includes a set of socio-economic characteristics such as
marital status, household size, employment status and wealth, ajt indicates the practice j’s points weighted
average achievement rates for disease control, cij is the time-invariant unobserved component of patient i
registered in practice j and ijt is the error term.
We then take the first-difference between 2006 and 2004:
∆yij = β0∆xij + γ0∆aj + ∆ij (23)
where ∆yij = yijt=2006 − yijt=2004 indicates the difference in lifestyle behaviours between 2006 and 2004 of
patient i registered with practice j9. As a result, patient i registered in practice j time-invariant unobserved
9We account for the uncertainty of having multiple practices matched to patients as follows. We create a dataset with 10
random draws of practices within each stratum (i.e. an individual-wave observation) where the probability of drawing is given
by the constructed sampling weights. That is, practices with larger patient populations (i.e. practice j’s “list size”) are weighted
more than practices with a smaller population. For instance, if patient i is matched to 5 different practices (one with 12,791
patients, one with 8,186 patients, one with 4,498 patients, one with 3,236 patients and one with 2,968 patients), then this patient
will be observed 10 times. The duplication will account for the practice population and we will observe patient i in the practice
with the highest population four out of the 10 times (weight = [12, 791/(2, 968 + 4, 498 + 12, 791 + 3, 236 + 8, 186)] = 0.40).
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component cij is differenced out. ∆xij includes changes in socio-economic characteristics.
∆aj indicates the change in practice j’s points weighted average achievement rates for disease control
between 2004 and 2006. If patient and doctor efforts are complements (substitutes), the patient responds to
doctor’s effort by increasing (reducing) her effort and γ0 > 0 (γ0 < 0).
All models for physical activity and alcohol drinking are run on the full sample. Cigarette consumption is
modelled on the sample of smokers in 2004. Lifestyle behaviours are examined separately because we found
correlations between changes in cigarette and alcohol consumption, and physical activity between 2004 and
2006 to be below one percent. Cutler and Glaeser (2005) examine changes in health behaviours (i.e. smoking,
drinking heavily, being overweight, or not exercising) using the Health and Retirement Study from 1992 to
2002. They also find that behavioural changes are not highly correlated with a correlation coefficient lower
than one percent.
In Table 4 the OLS regressions provide weak evidence that patient’s effort responds to doctor’s effort.
Although the effects are not statistically significant, the point estimates suggest that an increase in disease
control would reduce the number of cigarettes per day, it would increase intensity of physical activity, but it
would also increase alcohol consumption. However, this differential effect might be due to the direction of
the bias induced by doctor’s expectation of patient’s effort.
There are two reasons why estimates of γ0 might be biased. First, patient’s response to doctor’s effort
is generated by the doctor’s anticipation of the patient behaviour. Although we use an aggregate proxy for
doctor’s effort (i.e. the practice achievement rate), on average there might be unobserved (to us, but not to
the average doctor) patient characteristics (e.g. patient’s lack of self-control towards unhealthier lifestyles)
that imply a reverse causal relation between doctor and patient efforts. This bias could be severe in large
practices serving a diverse population where (unobserved) attitudes towards health behaviours may vary
within the same practice. A second issue is that doctor’s effort is essentially unobservable. Instead, we
proxy for it using the points weighted average achievement rates for disease control, that is, the practice
production function. As this is determined by a variety of inputs, including doctor and patient efforts, and
other practice characteristics, we essentially face a form of measurement error that biases estimates of γ0
when we use points weighted average achievement rates for disease control as a proxy for doctor’s effort.
Note that if an ELSA respondent is uniquely matched to a single practice then she will be duplicated 10 times. Then we weight
the observations in the regression using the constructed sampling weights. We note that our results are robust to the exclusion
of patients matched to multiple practices. We can make these results available on request.
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4.2 Instrumental Variable models
The issues of reverse causality, omitted factors and measurement error motivate our instrumental variable
approach. In other words, our aim is to isolate variations induced by doctor’s effort from all other potential
determinants of the practice disease control achievement. To do so, we use the potential change in revenue
induced by modifications of the QOF incentive as an instrument for the practice disease control achievement.
In the first stage we predict doctor’s effort from a reduced form estimation of the change in the average
doctor’s disease control effort on the potential change in revenue (Eq. (24)). We then include this predicted
effort by the doctor in the second stage equation of the change in lifestyle behaviours (Eq. (25)).
Analytically, the first stage regression of the change in the average doctor’s disease control effort between
2004 and 2006 can be written as follows:
∆aj = ζ∆Rj + λ∆xij + ∆ηij (24)
where ∆Rj is the instrument and measures the potential change in revenue as defined in the previous section,
and ηij is the error term. As a result, ζ is the change in doctor’s effort in response to a potential change in
revenue as defined in Eq. (9). We argue that this instrument is valid since, even if patients were aware of
the price and threshold changes (which is unlikely) they would not be aware of how these changes affected
specific practices or health care indicators.
In addition to the socio-economic characteristics described above, ∆xij includes the Low Income Scheme
Index (LISI), a deprivation measure of practice j’s list of patients.
The second-stage consists of first differenced linear models of lifestyle behaviours as in Eq. (23), but with
the inclusion of the first-stage predicted doctor effort:
∆yij = β1∆xij + γ1∆aˆj + ∆uij (25)
Patient’s causal response to doctor’s effort in Eq. (3) is represented by γ1. After including the first stage
predicted doctor’s effort, the change in effort ∆aˆj is one exogenously induced by the payer via the potential
change in revenue. As a result, the coefficient γ1 is an unbiased estimate of patient i’s response to doctor’s
effort and it is positive (negative) if she responds to doctor’s effort by engaging in healthier (unhealthier)
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lifestyle behaviours.
As an initial step in our 2SLS approach, we examine the power of the instrument and find that the
potential change in revenue is a strong predictor of changes in the average doctor’s disease control effort10
as reported in Table 5. A one standard deviation change in the revenue shock results in a 0.69 standard
deviation increase in disease control11. This means that the higher the avoided loss for practice j, i.e. the
more powered the incentive that the practice is facing, the more it would do to manage its patients’ disease.
This positive relation between the average doctor’s effort and the potential change in revenue is the one we
expected from Figure 3. The first stage F-statistics (not reported on the Table) take values between 11.59
and 19.93 that are above both the critical values outlined in Stock and Yogo (2005) and the conventional
minimum value of F=10 ( Stock et al. (2002)), meaning that we can reject the null that the potential change
in revenue is a weak instrument. Given that we cluster standard errors at the practice level, errors cannot
be assumed to be i.i.d. and so we also check the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank F-statistics, robust to non-i.i.d
errors, and we confirm the results of the previous test as reported in Table 5.
In the second stage in Table 6, we provide our key results and find that patients complement more effective
disease control effort by the doctor with better lifestyle behaviours. An average practice which increases its
rate of disease control from 76% to 83% triggers a reduction in patient’s frequency of alcohol drinking by
0.05 points of a category and a reduction in cigarette consumption by 1.7 per day per smoker12. The former
is however only weakly statistically significant at 10% level. This indicates that doctor and patient efforts
are complements, i.e. ϕya(y
∗, a) > 0 in Eq. (1). The magnitude of this effect, corresponding to about 12%
of the mean, is smaller than previous research by Fichera et al. (2016) who find an 18% decline of the mean
of cigarette smoking. However, the study by Fichera et al. (2016) focused on the introduction of the QOF
in 2004, whose effect had already been shown to be larger than that of later years (see for example, Doran
et al. (2011)) and did not investigate any specific intervention.
Finally, we examine the comparative statics derived in the theory section in Eq. (10) and estimate a
reduced form model with patient’s lifestyle response as a function of the potential change in revenue induced
10We run the first stage regressions separately on each sample of lifestyle behaviours for which data on lifestyle behaviours
are available.
11This is calculated as the ratio of the standard deviations of disease control and the potential change in revenue, respectively,
times ζ , that is, ζ
′
= (0.077/0.062) ∗ 0.56.
12These are calculated as the average change in doctor’s effort in practice j times the average change in patient i’s alcohol
drinking (i.e. (83− 76) ∗ 0.007) and smoking (i.e. (83− 76) ∗ 0.24).
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by the QOF price:
∆yij = ϑ∆Rj + λ∆xij + ∆ηij (26)
given that we find ϑ > 0, indicating complementarity between patient and doctor efforts (ϕya(y
∗, a) > 0),
we also expect that γ1 > 0 because a change in patient’s lifestyle behaviour can only occur through doctor’s
effort. In other words, we expect that patient’s health behaviour responds to a potential change in revenue
induced by changes in the QOF prices, i.e. a version of Eq. (10). We report ϑ estimates in Table 7 and find
that the higher the practice j’s avoided loss from a change in the payment function, the more effort patient
i would put in engaging in healthier lifestyle behaviours (i.e. ϑ > 0). In other words, for an average practice
facing a potential change in revenue of as much as 5%, there would be a decrease of drinking equal to 0.02
points of a category and a decrease of 0.7 cigarettes per day13.
4.2.1 Identification
In order for γ1 in Eq. (25) to isolate only variations in doctor’s effort and to represent a Local Average
Treatment Effect (LATE), we assume internal validity of our instrument14. This is essentially untestable,
but we make the following arguments in support to our identification strategy.
Assumption 1: (Conditional) Independence
∆Rj ⊥ [∆yij(∆Rj ,∆aj),∆aj(∆Rj)] |∆xij
This assumes that the potential change in revenue is as good as randomly assigned. It implies that
the potential change in revenue is orthogonal to changes in all individual patient determinants of lifestyle
behaviours and practice disease control determinants, conditional on some (vector of) covariate(s) ∆xij .
There are at least three scenarios that would violate this assumption. First, compositional patient
selection could occur if there is evidence that individual health behaviours and characteristics differ between
high and low achieving practices. Evidence of imbalance in the patient mix across best and worse practices
might indicate selection on unobservables. We attempt to mitigate this concern by controlling for a rich set
of patient characteristics and for the Low Income Scheme Index (LISI), a deprivation measure of practice
13These are calculated as the average potential change in revenue of practice j times the average change in patient i’s alcohol
drinking (i.e. (5) ∗ 0.004) and smoking (i.e. (5) ∗ 0.13).
14We will return to the issue of external validity in the discussion.
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j’s list of patients. In other words, the independence assumption needs only to hold conditional on these
characteristics. However, we also test whether patient mix (in terms of behaviours and other characteristics)
is balanced across low and high achieving practices. To do so, we define best practices as those with 2004
points weighted average achievement rates above the median of that year and estimate the following model:
zij = ξIj + β1xj + ij (27)
where zij represents separate outcomes: either patient health behaviours (i.e. physical activity, drinking
and smoking), yij , or patient employment and wealth, wij ; Ij is a dummy variable equal to one if practice
j points weighted average achievement rates in 2004 are on or above the 2004 median and zero otherwise;
xj represents the LISI of practice j; ij is an error term. Eq. (27) has been estimated in 2004 for the
sample of individuals diagnosed with CVD. Our coefficient of interest is ξ. Our hypothesis is that there
should not be any statistically significant evidence of differences between best and worse practices in patient
health behaviours and characteristics amongst those who have been diagnosed with CVD in 2004 (i.e. ξ = 0).
Indeed, we do not find any statistically significant evidence of patient selection as individual health behaviours
and characteristics do not differ between high and low achieving practices (Table 8). We only find a very
weakly statistical significant evidence that in high achieving practices patients are more likely to be employed.
A second indication that conditional independence might be violated arises from heterogeneity in the
marginal product of doctor’s effort on patient health behaviours across low and high achieving practices.
Thus, even if doctor’s effort is the same across best and worse practices, patient health behaviours might
respond to the change in price because of the differential effect of doctor’s effort. We first interact the
indicator of best practices, Ij , separately with the change in disease control achievement and with our
instrument. We then test whether there is a statistically significant response of patient’s effort on doctor’s
effort in high versus low achieving practices. In the top panel of Table 9 there is evidence that reduction in
cigarette smoking is stronger in practices with achievement rate below the 2004 median. However, this is
not surprising because the incentive payment was such that those who were already performing well in 2004
had to do less in order to get a higher payment.
Third, practices may vary in the way they respond to the potential change in revenue depending on the
initial performance. For example, practices with lower performance have more room for improvement. In our
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main models we control for time-variant changes in the patient pool by including the LISI. However, there
still could be an omitted variable bias if unobserved factors affecting individuals’ changes in health behaviours
are related to the initial practice performance. It is unlikely that the individual patient underlying propensity
to healthier behaviours is correlated with the aggregated changes in practice performance. Nevertheless, we
modify Eq. (25) and include the initial performance of the practice in 2004:
∆yij = β1∆xij + γ1∆aˆj + γ2a
04
j + ∆uij . (28)
In the bottom panel of Table 9 we show that the complementary effect of the average doctor’s effort with
the patient’s cigarette and alcohol consumption is robust to the inclusion of the initial practice performance
in 2004. Although this effect is more statistically significant than in the main models, its size is around half
the one in Table 6, for cigarette and alcohol consumption, respectively. For an average practice increasing
its rate of disease control from 76% to 83% there would be a reduction of the frequency of alcohol drinking
by 0.02 points of a category and a reduction of one cigarette per day per smoker15. Baseline performance is
statistically significant in the first stage, but it is not displayed on the table. Given that we checked whether
patient characteristics and behaviours were balanced between best and worse practices, the smaller size of
our coefficient might reflect the fact that best practices had to do less to avoid a larger loss. Still, our results
show complementarity between drinking and smoking and doctor effort. Nevertheless, we take this result
to be the low bound estimate equivalent to about 7% of the mean number of cigarettes in our sample and
almost 1% of the mean frequency of alcohol drinking.
Assumption 2: Exclusion Restriction
[∆yij(∆Rj ,∆aj) = ∆yij(∆aj)] |∆xij
This assumes that doctor’s effort is the only channel through which the potential change in revenue affects
patient health behaviours. Just like for the independence assumption, it can hold conditional on some vector
of covariates ∆xij .
Checking this assumption implies thinking about the underlying mechanisms (other than doctor’s effort)
that could drive the association between practice achievement rate and patient health behaviours. To do
15These are calculated as the average change in doctor’s effort in practice j times the average change in patient i’s alcohol
drinking (i.e. (83− 76) ∗ 0.003) and smoking (i.e. (83− 76) ∗ 0.14).
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so, we need to show that these other potential mechanisms do not explain our results, conditional on the
measure for practice deprivation and other patient characteristics. A first simple check on this is to look
for an association between the potential change in revenue and patient characteristics that should not be
affected by doctor’s effort. To do so, we estimate the same 2SLS models as in Eq. (25) and replace the
outcome variables with the change in non single marital status and in household size since these are clearly
unrelated to doctor effort. Our null hypothesis is that γ1 = 0. Indeed, in Table 10 we report no evidence
that the change in disease control induced by the QOF has affected patient characteristics (i.e. change in
marital status, and household size).
Another useful check is to look for an association between the potential change in revenue and outcomes in
samples where we would not expect doctor’s effort to affect them. Our concern is that the complementarity
effect we find might result from a general improvement of practices after the QOF was introduced and not
from the change in doctor’s effort induced by the potential change in revenue for CVD indicators. We
check this in three ways. First, we estimate the same 2SLS models as in Eq. (25) where ∆aˆj represents
the practice points weighted achievement rates for cervical screening16. We select this indicator because its
lower threshold of achievement was raised from 25% in 2004 to 40% in 2006 and because it is completely
unrelated to CVD disease control. We use this change in threshold to construct the new instrument, ∆Rj ,
and re-estimate the 2SLS in Eqs. (25 and 24) but on the sample of women. If the change in patient health
behaviours is solely attributed to the change in doctor’s effort induced by the change in CVD incentives
and not to a general practice improvement, then we should expect γ1 = 0. Test A in Table 11 shows that
cervical screening, whose payment thresholds changed in the 2006 QOF, has not affected women’s lifestyle
behaviours17. Second, we re-estimate the 2SLS models in Eqs. (25 and 24) on the sample of individuals
without CVD. Again, our null hypothesis is that γ1 = 0. Test B in Table 11 cannot reject this hypothesis
indicating no statistical significant effect of doctor effort on patient effort. The size and sign of the coefficients
are also very different from our main models in Table 6. Finally, if the complementarity effect is attributable
to the disease control effort of doctors, then we should not find any effect on outcomes unrelated to patient
lifestyles. So we re-estimate the same 2SLS models as in Eq. (25) where ∆yij represents other behavioural
outcomes, namely changes in savings and in the value of the pension fund which again are unrelated to
16This measures the proportion of patients aged 25-64 years whose notes record that a cervical smear has been performed
in the last three to five years.
17The first stage models (not reported on the table) indicate that the potential change in revenue is a strong instrument for
doctor’s effort in cervical screening.
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doctor effort. As reported in Test C of Table 11, there is no statistical significant evidence that doctor effort
impacts on behavioural outcomes other than lifestyles. All in all, these falsification tests provide stronger
evidence that there are no channels other than doctor’s effort that have driven our results.
Assumption 3: Monotonicity
either ζ ≥ 0 or ζ ≤ 0
This means that while doctor response to the incentive may depend on the size of the potential change
in revenue, all those who are affected by this potential change in revenue, respond in the same way. In our
case where both the endogenous variable and the instrument are non-binary, it requires that doctor’s effort
is weakly increasing in the potential change in revenue, that is, doctor’s effort should be larger, the higher
the avoided loss for the practice.
We partition the instrument to resemble the structure of the incentive represented in Figure (1): (i) when
a04L ≤ at < a06L ; (ii) when a06L ≤ at < a04U ; (iii) when a04U ≤ at < a06U ; and (iv) when at ≥ a06U 18. We then
modify the first-stage regression in Eq. (24) as follows:
∆aj = ζ1∆R
1
j + ζ2∆R
2
j + ζ3∆R
3
j + λ∆xij + ∆ηij (29)
where ∆R1j ,∆R
2
j ,∆R
3
j are the values of the instrument when a
t lies within each of the ranges (i)-(iii) above.
We expect that (ζ1 > ζ2 > ζ3) > 0 if complementarity holds and doctor’s effort increases with the averted
loss for the practice. The second stage regression is the same as Eq.(25).
The first stage regressions displayed in Table 12 highlight that doctor response to the potential change in
revenue is higher, the steeper and stronger the incentive. For practices whose achievement was between the
2004 and 2006 lower thresholds, we would expect the potential change in revenue to be much higher as they
would stand to lose much more than other practices (e.g. they would get no reward if their achievement in
2006 was below 2006 lower threshold). In the third column of Table 12, a one standard deviation change
in the potential revenue shock ζ1 results in a 0.30 standard deviation increase in disease control which is 30
times larger than the 0.01 standard deviation change for ζ3
19. The second stage regressions displayed in
Table 13 remain largely unchanged because we have only partitioned the previous instrument.
18We do not have practice with at ≤ a04L .
19These are calculated as the ratio of the standard deviations of disease control and the potential change in revenue,
respectively, times ζ1, that is, ζ
′
1 = (0.028/0.062) ∗ 0.67. And for the price change ζ3, it is ζ
′
3 = (0.000098/0.062) ∗ 0.38.
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Only given the first-stage regression, the conditional independence assumption, the exclusion restriction
and monotonicity, can the coefficient γ1 in Eq. (25) be interpreted as the effect of doctor’s effort on those
whose treatment status can be changed by the new incentive. Under these assumptions, γ1 in Eq. (25) is
the LATE.
5 Robustness checks
We consider a number of robustness checks entailing the instrument, the choice of indicators, lifestyle
behaviours and the specification strategy, and patient heterogeneity. Firstly, we use a more flexible speci-
fication of the instrument with the second order polynomial of the potential change in revenue in the first
stage regression. When we allow for a quadratic specification of the instrument (first stage not reported on
the top panel of Table 14), we find the complementarity effect in cigarette smoking to be of similar size to
our main results.
Secondly, in the main models we focus on only four of the total 33 indicators available for CVD. This
choice was driven by the focus on those indicators that were directly affected by the potential change in
revenue. However, as the 33 indicators available for CVD make up for 40% of the 550 total points available
for clinical care in the first year of the scheme20, there could be effort diversion issues as worse practices
might put more effort on indicators for which no change in the incentive occurred. To do so, we modify Eq.
(25) and consider achievement rates for the full set of 33 indicators. In the bottom panel of Table 14, we
report the average doctor’s effort in all indicators that apply to CVD. The sample is slightly smaller than
in previous tables because some practices did not report their achievement in at least one of the additional
indicators that we consider. This might explain why the effect on alcohol consumption is not statistically
significant. The size and statistical significance of the relation between average doctor’s effort and patient’s
cigarette consumption is slightly larger than the one in Table 6 mitigating concerns of effort diversion. For
an average practice increasing its rate of disease control from 76% to 83% there would be a reduction of two
cigarettes per day per smoker.
Thirdly, we examine different definitions of health behaviours. We consider reduction in cigarette smoking
for all those diagnosed with CVD in 2004, including former smokers. We also investigate whether comple-
20More specifically, 15 indicators were available for Coronary Heart Diseases (CHD) with a maximum of 121 points and 18
indicators were available for diabetes with 99 points in total. Note that CVD encompasses both CHD and diabetes.
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mentarity between doctor and patient efforts occurs at the extensive margin (e.g. patients quit smoking)
rather than intensive margin. We explore whether problem drinkers have responded to changes in doctor’s
effort by defining a variable ”no daily drinking” as equal to one if patient i drinks frequently, rarely or never
drinks and zero if she drinks daily. We modify Eq. (25) and consider ∆yij as the change in each of these
three outcomes. Although we find no statistically significant effect on quitting smoking, in the top panel of
Table 15 we show that complementarity between doctor’s effort and patient reduction of cigarette smoking
holds even when we include former smokers. However, the size of the effect for an average practice increasing
its rate of disease control from 76% to 83% is reduced to 0.4 cigarettes per day per patient. We also find
that doctor’s effort reduces daily drinking, although the effect is only weakly statistically significant.
Fourthly, we investigate whether patients who switch practices have significantly different lifestyle be-
haviours from those who do not move. To do so, we define “mover” as a dummy variable that equals one in
2004 if patient i changes practice in 2006 and re-estimate Eq. (25). If changes in patient mix are not related
to observed patient characteristics then “movers” should not have statistically significant different lifestyle
behaviours to non-movers. There is no statistically significant evidence of changes in health behaviours
amongst those who will switch practice in 2006 (bottom panel of Table 15).
Finally, we consider whether patient response varies with her age and baseline wealth. To this purpose
we modify Eq. (25) as follows:
∆yij = β1∆xij + γ0∆aˆ+ γ1∆aˆ ∗Dij + γ2Dij + ∆uij . (30)
We estimate Eq.(30) separately with the dummy Dij indicating either age or wealth. In the first model we
interact the change in disease control with Dij that equals one if patient i’s age is on or above 69 years. We
also include this age dummy and the change in disease control in Eq.(30). We are interested in the coefficients
γ0 and γ1 indicating the effect of doctor effort on patient lifestyle choices for younger and older patients,
respectively. In the top panel of Table 16, we show that the reduction in cigarette smoking is stronger for
relatively younger patients. It may be explained by the fact that these patients expect to benefit from the
returns of healthier lifestyle behaviours over a relatively longer time horizon than older patients. It could
also be due to the fact that relatively younger patients are more malleable and their lifestyle behaviours can
be modified more easily than older patients. In the second model, we interact the change in disease control
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with Dij that equals one if patient i’s logarithm of equivalised wealth in 2004 is on or above its median. We
also include this wealth dummy and the change in disease control in Eq.(30). Again, we are interested in the
coefficients γ0 and γ1 indicating the effect of doctor effort on patient behaviour for relatively less wealthy and
wealthier patients, respectively. In the bottom panel of Table 16, we show that the reduction in cigarette
smoking is stronger for relatively less wealthy patients.
6 Mechanisms
Why does doctor effort affect patient health behaviour? What are the “mechanisms” that generate
complementarities between doctor and patient effort? Are doctors directly providing lifestyle change advice
in addition to or in lieu of prescribing? Are they encouraging follow-ups or check-ups? NICE guidelines for
CVD suggest a combination of medical treatment and behaviour change interventions, through reduction of
smoking and drinking, and increase in physical activity (NICE (2009); NICE (2014); NICE (2015)). Whilst
these guidelines became official after our period of interest, it is reasonable to suppose that doctors may
have adopted best practice management in striving to meet QOF indicators in these conditions. Although
the focus of this paper is not on the mechanisms, these are important questions for the policy implications
of this study.
The initial waves of the ELSA data contain limited information on doctor effort. We have no information
on whether doctors increased follow-ups or gave advice to reduce alcohol drinking and improve physical
activity. We also have limited information on prescriptions and the type of drugs prescribed especially in
the years where there is no nurse visit.
All the models we use are a re-estimation of Eq. (25) where the outcome variable denotes each of the
“mechanisms” we consider. We investigate whether doctor prescription has changed using patient reports
of the prescription of beta blockers, blood thinning medication, ACE inhibitors, or medication to reduce
blood pressure. As these questions are asked by nurses during their visit, they are only available in 2004
and 2008. For those diagnosed with CVD prior to 2006 and who are observed both in 2006 and 2008,
we assume their prescription did not change and we use the 2008 self-report prescription for 2006. We
maintain the same assumption for the variable indicating whether they had blood pressure checks. We
also consider an indicator which equals one if those who were smokers in 2004 received smoking cessation
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advice. As reported in Table 17, we find that doctor effort increased her prescription behaviour and smoking
cessation advice, although only the latter is (weakly) statistically significant21. We do not find evidence that
blood pressure checks changed potentially due to the fact that these activities were undertaken by nurses
not doctors. Previous studies such as the one by Doran et al. (2011) have shown that although practice
performance reached a plateau after the QOF was introduced, in 2006-07 achievement rates for measurement
and prescribing indicators were still higher than the projected pre-QOF trend. However, because of many
sources of measurement error, we refrain from concluding that our results are in contrast to these previous
studies.
7 Conclusions
The use of performance pay incentives is increasing in public sectors such as education and health care.
Whilst numerous studies have investigated the effect of these incentives on targeted agents, not much is
known about their effects for the interaction between agents. This is particularly important in complex
organisations where the outcome (health or education) is a joint product between different agents. In such
contexts, incentives onto targeted agents might be enhanced or mitigated by complementary or substitute
actions of related agents.
This is the first paper that examines the interaction between doctor and patients in the joint production
of health. Lack of data and reasonable instruments to determine patient’s response to doctor’s provision of
treatment are two reasons for this gap in research, which this study fills.
Our stylised model has obtained predictions of a patient-doctor interaction to motivate our empirical
strategy. It shows that patient’s response to doctor’s effort depends on the degree of complementarity and
substitution of doctor and patient efforts. Comparative statics and illustrative figures suggest that doctors
respond to an increase in prices and thresholds in their payment system by increasing effort. The extent to
which patients will increase or decrease their effort in response to these potential revenue changes also depends
on the degree of complementarity and substitution between patient’s and doctor’s efforts. This matters for
welfare and the optimal design of incentive schemes: if patient’s and doctor’s efforts are complements then
21Smoking cessation advice was directly incentivised by the QOF. However, we note that in 2004 smoking cessation advice
was split across several indicators and disease areas and it was then aggregated from 2006 onwards. Because of this change in
definition and because only the lower threshold (for which we have no practices) changed between 2004 and 2006, we do not
consider this indicator.
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the optimal price, i.e. the power of the incentive scheme, is higher. This is because by incentivising doctor’s
effort, the purchaser also incentivises patient’s effort, a form of positive spillover effect. Conversely, if efforts
are substitutes, then the spillover is negative and the optimal price is lower.
Our empirical analysis suggests that patient’s and doctor’s efforts are complements, as patients increase
their efforts in healthier lifestyle behaviours when doctors increase their treatment efforts. More precisely,
for an average primary care practice increasing its CVD control rate of their patients from 76% to 83%
there is a reduction of frequency of drinking by 0.05 points of a category and cigarette consumption by
1-1.7 cigarettes per day per smoker. The former corresponds to about 2% of the sample mean. The latter,
corresponding to about 7-12% of the sample mean, is smaller than previous research by Fichera et al. (2016)
who find an 18% decline of the mean cigarette smoking. However, this previous research had focused on the
introduction of the QOF whose impact was notably larger (Doran et al. (2011)). We find no effect on physical
activity. Our identification strategy relies on a 2SLS approach which instruments doctor’s effort with an
exogenous potential change in revenue induced by the QOF incentive scheme: a one standard deviation
change in the potential revenue shock results in a 0.69 standard deviation increase in disease control. Our
complementarity results contrast those by Kaestner et al. (2014) and Lakdawalla et al. (2006) who both
found that medical innovation induces riskier health behaviours. However, our study focus is on the effect
of a doctor incentive system which incentivised both information provision and treatment. Their analysis
focuses on availability of cheaper treatments either because they are more easily available in the market
(i.e. penetration of statins and new HIV treatments) or because changes in Medicaid eligibility allows for
cheaper access to these treatments. According to these studies, medical innovation induces substitutability
with healthier lifestyle behaviours, but it might not be so if doctor effort is incentivised.
One limitation of this study is the lack of data on individual doctor’s disease control effort. We use
instead the average performance of the practice. This is advantageous in that it avoids selection biases
caused by matching of patients and individual doctors, but it does induce a form of measurement error
which may, if anything, attenuate our results. A second possible limitation with our type of study relates
to announcement versus implementation effects. In 2003/04, the “preparatory phase” of the QOF, details
of the quality targets were in the public domain (but incentives were not yet available) and might have
generated anticipatory effects. A study by Doran et al. (2011) used data on a sample of primary care
practices from the General Practice Research Database (GPRD). They showed that there was already an
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upward quality trend in primary care practices since 2002/03, but the introduction of the QOF improved
performance over and above this trend at least in 2004, its first year of introduction. This was stronger
for measurement indicators than for prescribing indicators. As the QOF was rolled out nationally, they
recognise the absence of control practices makes it hard to establish that this jump in performance was
entirely due to the QOF. Although Doran et al. (2011) could not investigate practice heterogeneities, we
might expect that better practices were more able to make adjustments prior to the introduction of the
QOF and, therefore, perform better thereafter. Any anticipation effects, or heterogeneity in such effects,
would be an issue in our study if we were comparing pre and post-QOF outcomes but are less worrying
since this is not the method we use. Instead, our identification is based on reactions to changes in financial
incentives within the QOF between 2004 and 2006, which could have not been anticipated in the preparatory
phase. Nevertheless, this is one of the reasons why we have controlled for baseline performance in one of
our robustness checks and why we have examined practice heterogeneities. Our results are robust to these
alternative specifications suggesting that potential anticipatory effects would not qualitatively change our
results. A third potential limitation relates to the fact that our results are only relevant for all those
practices that were not always under or over performing throughout the sample period. We note that this
is actually the case for most of our sample of practices (over 80% of the 2006 practices). A fourth limitation
is the use of self-reported data on lifestyle behaviours which might also generate a measurement error. We
assume that this error is time invariant and therefore it is differenced out in our empirical specification. For
instance, Clark and Etile´ (2002) find that in the British Household Panel Survey smokers report cigarette
consumption in fractions and multiples of a packet (a measurement error called “heaping” in self-reported job
tenure data). Instead of aggregating the data around “heaping” points for the case of cigarette smoking, a
process that would reduce variation in our data, we assume that in the short time period between interviews
individuals will always make the same approximation when asked about the average number of cigarettes
smoked per day. A final limitation is the lack of data on the mechanisms that might have brought about these
complementarities. With some strong assumptions about data measurement, we have found that practice
disease control is positively associated with doctor prescription and smoking cessation advice, though only
the latter is (weakly) statistically significant. These results might suggest that doctors responded to the
financial incentive by adopting best practice management for patients with CVD. This change in effort was
then complemented by healthier patient lifestyles.
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Nevertheless, our results suggest that by rewarding achievement on specific indicators this incentive
scheme has also impacted on patient health behaviours because of the interaction between doctors and
patients. In terms of policy design, our empirical results also suggest that doctors’ incentive schemes could
be higher powered since there are higher overall benefits from setting higher prices. On the methodological
side, our analysis demonstrates the potential value of research exploiting matched data on doctors and their
patients. Such data are becoming more readily available for researchers both in the U.K. and elsewhere,
and we would expect this development to lead to other empirical insights on health behaviours and their
interaction with health care.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium performance
Figure 2: Increase in upper threshold aU
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Figure 3: Increase in upper threshold aU and price p
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Figure 4: Marginal revenue function: increase in price and thresholds
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Figure 5: The potential revenue change function
Note: at indicates the proportion of treated patients and ∆R is the potential change in revenue.
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Table 1: Definition of the variables used in the models by year
All sample 2004 2006
Definition Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Outcome variables:
Physical activity Physical activity on a 4-point scale: (2,249) (2,249)
1=no physical activity 0.18% 0.18%
2=low physical activity 15.61% 18.19%
3=moderate physical activity 55.45% 54.87%
4=high physical activity 28.77% 26.77%
Alcohol drinking Alcohol drinking in 4 points scale: (2,080) (2,080)
1=daily 19.57% 17.74%
2=frequently 41.49% 41.35%
3=rarely 29.23% 29.28%
4=never 9.71% 11.63%
Individual characteristics:
Household size Number of household members 1.9 0.8 1.9 0.8
(2,249) (2,249)
Non single Married/cohabitee/civil partner 67.045% 68.8%
(2,249) (2,249)
Ln(wealth) Natural logarithm of real equivalised household 11.87 1.6 11.87 1.6
wealth in £ (2,249) (2,249)
Employed Whether individual is employed vs. unemployed, 26.85% 24.41%
disabled, retired, home work (2,249) (2,249)
Smokers in 2004 2004 2006
Definition Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Outcome variable:
Number of cigarettes Average no. cigarettes per day -13.94 8.67 -12.24 9.34
per day (negatively coded) (238) (238)
Individual characteristics:
Household size Number of household members 1.83 0.77 1.78 0.76
(238) (238)
Non single Married/cohabitee/civil partner 62.18% 57.98%
(238) (238)
Ln(wealth) Natural logarithm of real equivalised household 11.06 2.18 11.13 2.06
wealth in £ (238) (238)
Employed Whether individual is employed vs. unemployed, 26.05% 22.27%
disabled, retired, home work (238) (238)
Notes: descriptive statistics on the balanced sample of individuals 50+ with CVD for whom practice characteristics
and individual characteristics are observed. The sample for individual characteristics is conditional on physical
activity being also observed. Number of observations in (); S.D.=standard deviation. Wealth is measured in pounds
sterling and deflated by the Consumer Price Index with 2005 as the base year. Physical activity is coded as follows:
1 (none) - not working or sedentary occupation, or engages in only mild exercise; 2 (low) - working in a job that involves
standing and/or engaging in moderate activity; 3 (moderate) - working in a job involving physical work and/or enga-
ging in vigorous activity once a week to 1-3 times a month; 4 (high) - engaged in heavy manual work and/or doing
vigorous leisure activity more than once a week. The sample of CVD patients (smokers and non-smokers) used in the
analysis is lower than the sample of individuals with CVD because of missing values in the individual characteristics.
We also note that the balanced sample may suffer from attrition bias. We compare the individual characteristics and
behaviours of the balanced sample with the unbalanced sample and we find little difference between the two. This
additional table can be made available from the authors on request.
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Table 2: Description of indicators of doctors’ disease control
Indicator Description 2004 2006
name LT UT Points Price LT UT Points Price
per point per point
The percentage of patients with
CHD8 coronary heart disease whose last 25 60 16 £75 40 70 17 £126
measured cholesterol (measured in
the last 15 months) is 7mmol/l or less.
The percentage of patients with diabetes
DM7 in whom the last HbA1C is 10 or less (or 25 85 11 £75 40 90 11 £126
equivalent test/reference range depen-
ding on local laboratory) in last 15 months.
DM12 The percentage of patients with diabetes 25 55 17 £75 40 60 18 £126
in whom the last blood pressure is 145/85
or less.
DM17 The percentage of patients with diabetes 25 60 6 £75 40 70 6 £126
whose last measured total cholesterol
within previous 15 months is 5 or less.
LT=Lower Threshold; UT=Upper Threshold.
Table 3: Summary statistics on the average achievement rates and potential change in revenue
Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev.
Disease Control in 2004 [a04] 0.76 (2,642) 0.004 1 0.08
Disease Control in 2006 [a06] 0.83 (2,523) 0.08 1 0.05
Potential Revenue change [∆R] 0.05 (2,269) 0 0.39 0.07
Note: Statistics weighted by the constructed sampling weights. The achievement rates are weighted by the number of
points. Sample sizes in () represent practices.
Table 4: Coefficients of first differenced linear models of health behaviours
Model I: Model II: Model III:
Increase in Reduction in Reduction in
physical activity alcohol drinking no. cigarettes
Change in Disease Control (γ0) 0.30 -0.08 8.30
(0.24) (0.23) (7.31)
Change in non single status 0.01 0.12 1.86
(0.11) (0.10) (1.86)
Change in employed status 0.02 0.08* 1.34
(0.06) (0.04) (2.05)
Change in household size -0.01 0.04 -1.09
(0.03) (0.03) (0.92)
Change in Ln(equivalised wealth) 0.02 0.02 -0.16
(0.02) (0.02) (0.57)
Change in LISI -0.004 -0.006 0.03
(0.007) (0.007) (0.24)
Constant -0.07*** 0.07*** 1.12
(0.02) (0.02) (0.76)
No. observations 22,467 20,782 2,379
No. individuals 2,249 2,080 238
No. practices 1,505 1,400 248
Statistics weighted by the constructed sampling weights and clustered std. errors in (). No. observations for the 10
imputed datasets on the sample of people aged 50+ with CVD. Model III on sample of smokers in 2004. Lifestyles
increasing in health effort: intensity of physical activity, rarity of alcohol drinking and reduction in no. cigarettes.
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 5: First stage coefficients of first differenced linear models of practice achievement on the potential
change in revenue
Change in Change in Change in
Disease Control Disease Control Disease Control
on physical activity sample on alcohol sample on no. cigarettes sample
Potential revenue change (ζ) 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.56***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Change in non single status 0.0004 -0.004 -0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Change in employed status -0.01 -0.01 0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.01)
Change in household size 0.0005 0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.01)
Change in Ln(equivalised wealth) 0.001 0.0002 0.0001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Change in LISI -0.003* -0.002* -0.001
(0.0001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
No. observations 22,467 20,782 2,379
No. individuals 2,249 2,080 238
No. practices 1,505 1,400 248
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 409.1 384.9 171.3
Statistics weighted by the constructed sampling weights and clustered std. errors in (). No. observations for the 10 imputed
datasets on the sample of people aged 50+ with CVD.
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 6: Second stage coefficients of first differenced linear models of health behaviours
Model I: Model II: Model III:
Increase in Reduction in Reduction in
physical activity alcohol drinking no. cigarettes
Change in Disease Control (γ1) 0.16 0.71* 23.74**
(0.39) (0.40) (10.25)
Change in non single status 0.01 0.12 1.97
(0.11) (0.10) (2.02)
Change in employed status 0.02 0.08* 1.26
(0.06) (0.04) (1.99)
Change in household size -0.006 0.04 -1.10
(0.03) (0.03) (1.02)
Change in Ln(equivalised wealth) 0.02 0.02 -0.15
(0.02) (0.02) (0.59)
Change in LISI 0.004 0.01 0.06
(0.007) (0.01) (0.24)
Constant -0.05* 0.01 -0.14
(0.03) (0.03) (0.94)
No. observations 22,467 20,782 2,379
No. individuals 2,249 2,080 238
No. practices 1,505 1,400 248
Statistics weighted by the constructed sampling weights and clustered std. errors in (). No. observations for the 10 imputed
datasets on the sample of people aged 50+ with CVD. Model III on sample of smokers in 2004. Lifestyles increasing in health
effort: intensity of physical activity, rarity of alcohol drinking and reduction in number of cigarettes.
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Coefficients of first differenced linear models of health behaviours with potential change in revenue
Model I: Model II: Model III:
Increase in Reduction in Reduction in
physical activity alcohol drinking no. cigarettes
Potential revenue change (ϑ) 0.09 0.37* 13.14**
(0.20) (0.20) (5.53)
Change in non single status 0.01 0.12 1.99
(0.11) (0.10) (1.70)
Change in employed status 0.02 0.08* 1.28
(0.06) (0.04) (2.00)
Change in household size -0.01 0.04 -1.10
(0.03) (0.03) (0.85)
Change in Ln(equivalised wealth) 0.02 0.02 -0.14
(0.02) (0.02) (0.57)
Constant -0.05*** 0.05*** 1.03*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.57)
No. observations 22,467 20,782 2,379
No. individuals 2,249 2,080 238
No. practices 1,505 1,400 248
Statistics weighted by the constructed sampling weights and clustered std. errors in (). No. observations for the 10 imputed
datasets on the sample of people aged 50+ with CVD. Model III on sample of smokers in 2004. Lifestyles increasing in health
effort: intensity of physical activity, rarity of alcohol drinking and reduction in no. cigarettes.
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 8: Tests of compositional patient selection
Test A. Health behaviours Model I: Model II: Model III:
Increase in Reduction in Reduction in
physical activity alcohol drinking no. cigarettes
High achieving practices in 2004 (ξ) 0.01 -0.02 -0.23
(0.01) (0.03) (0.96)
Constant -0.07** 0.06 0.49
(0.03) (0.03) (1.15)
No. observations 22,467 20,782 2,379
No. individuals 2,249 2,080 238
No. practices 1,505 1,400 248
Test B. Patient characteristics Model I: Model II:
Employed Ln(equivalised wealth)
High achieving practices in 2004 (ξ) 0.01* -0.03
(0.01) (0.02)
Constant 0.26 12.5
(0.01) (0.03)
No. observations 29,028 29,028
No. individuals 2,904 2,904
No. practices 1,824 1,824
Statistics weighted by the constructed sampling weights and clustered std. errors in (). Model III on sample of smokers in
2004. Lifestyles increasing in health effort: intensity of physical activity, rarity of alcohol drinking and reduction in
number of cigarettes. All models include the LISI. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 9: Tests of practice heterogeneity using second stage models
Model I: Model II: Model III:
Increase in Reduction in Reduction in
physical activity alcohol drinking no. cigarettes
Test A. Heterogeneity of treatment and IV:
Change in Disease Control 0.47 1.20* 42.49**
(0.68) (0.72) (18.49)
Change in Disease Control for best practices 2.25 -1.21 -30.75
(4.01) (3.77) (57.2)
High achieving practices in 2004 (ξ) -0.06 0.11 3.84
(0.19) (0.18) (3.34)
Constant -0.10 -0.05 -2.83
(0.08) (0.08) (2.32)
No. observations 22,467 20,782 2,379
No. individuals 2,249 2,080 238
No. practices 1,505 1,400 248
Test B. Including Disease Control in 2004:
Change in Disease Control (γ1) 0.13 0.31*** 13.60***
(0.31) (0.10) (3.38)
Constant -0.05** 0.04*** 0.69**
(0.03) (0.01) (0.30)
No. observations 22,467 20,782 2,379
No. individuals 2,249 2,080 238
No. practices 1,505 1,400 248
Statistics weighted by the constructed sampling weights and clustered std. errors in (). Model III on sample of smokers in
2004. Lifestyles increasing in health effort: intensity of physical activity, rarity of alcohol drinking and reduction in
number of cigarettes. Second stage regressions displayed. All models include marital status, whether employed,
household size, wealth and LISI. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 10: Tests using second stage models with patient characteristics as outcomes
Model I: Model II:
Change in non single status Change in household size
Change in Disease Control -0.04 0.24
(0.08) (0.23)
Change in non single status - 0.87
(0.14)
Change in employed status -0.0004 0.01
(0.01) (0.04)
Change in household size 0.11*** -
(0.03)
Change in Ln(equivalised wealth) 0.01* -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Change in LISI -0.001 0.0001
(0.001) (0.01)
Constant -0.01 -0.05***
(0.01) (0.02)
No. observations 22,471 22,471
No. individuals 2,249 2,249
No. practices 1,505 1,505
Statistics weighted by the constructed sampling weights and clustered std. errors in (). No. observations for the 10 imputed
datasets on the sample of people aged 50+ with CVD. All models on the sample with no missings in physical activity.
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 11: Tests using second stage models with other outcomes and samples
Test A. Alternative indicator Model I: Model II: Model III:
Increase in Reduction in Reduction in
physical activity alcohol drinking no. cigarettes
Change in Cervical Screening 0.74 -0.51 20.70
(0.98) (1.00) (34.04)
Constant -0.05*** 0.10*** 1.30**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.57)
No. observations 12,231 11,295 1,399
No. individuals 1,224 1,130 140
No. practices 1,047 965 150
Test B. Non-CVD patients Model I: Model II: Model III:
Increase in Reduction in Reduction in
physical activity alcohol drinking no. cigarettes
Change in Disease Control 0.02 0.25 -12.33
(0.40) (0.33) (15.24)
Constant -0.04 0.02 2.73**
(0.03) (0.03) (1.16)
No. observations 20,182 18,007 2,350
No. individuals 1,313 1,802 235
No. practices 2,020 1,193 233
Test C. Other behaviours Model I: Model II:
Change in Savings Change in Pension
Change in Disease Control -8.03 -229.74
(19.92) (213.44)
Constant 0.45 15.08
(2.03) (13.38)
No. observations 26,215 18,497
No. individuals 2,624 1,852
No. practices 1,674 1,369
Statistics weighted by the constructed sampling weights and clustered std. errors in (). Model III on sample of smokers
in 2004. Lifestyles increasing in health effort: intensity of physical activity, rarity of alcohol drinking and reduction in
number of cigarettes. Second stage regressions displayed. All models include marital status, whether employed,
household size, wealth and LISI. Savings and pension values divided by £1,000. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 12: First stage coefficients of first differenced linear models of practice achievement on the partitioned
potential change in revenue
Change in Change in Change in
Disease Control Disease Control Disease Control
on physical activity sample on alcohol sample on no. cigarettes sample
Potential revenue change (ζ1) 0.86*** 0.82*** 0.67***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Potential revenue change (ζ2) 0.48*** 0.47*** 0.54***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Potential revenue change (ζ3) 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.38***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05)
Constant 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.0004) (0.004) (0.001)
No. observations 22,467 20,782 2,379
No. individuals 2,249 2,080 238
No. practices 1,505 1,400 248
Statistics weighted by the constructed sampling weights and clustered std. errors in (). No. observations for the 10
imputed datasets on the sample of people aged 50+ with CVD. All models include marital status, whether employed
household size, wealth and LISI. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 13: Second stage coefficients of first differenced linear models of health behaviours (from partitioned
IV models)
Model I: Model II: Model III:
Increase in Reduction in Reduction in
physical activity alcohol drinking no. cigarettes
Change in Disease Control (γ1) 0.17 0.75* 23.69**
(0.38) (0.41) (10.58)
Change in non single status 0.01 0.12 1.97
(0.11) (0.10) (2.02)
Change in employed status 0.02 0.08* 1.26
(0.06) (0.04) (1.99)
Change in household size -0.01 0.04 -1.10
(0.03) (0.03) (1.02)
Change in Ln(equivalised wealth) 0.02 0.02 -0.15
(0.02) (0.02) (0.59)
Change in LISI 0.004 0.01 0.06
(0.01) (0.01) (0.24)
Constant -0.06 0.01 -0.13
(0.03) (0.03) (0.96)
No. observations 22,467 20,782 2,379
No. individuals 2,249 2,080 238
No. practices 1,505 1,400 248
Statistics weighted by the constructed sampling weights and clustered std. errors in (). No. observations for the 10 imputed
datasets on the sample of people aged 50+ with CVD. Model III on sample of smokers in 2004. Lifestyles increasing in health
effort: intensity of physical activity, rarity of alcohol drinking and reduction in number of cigarettes.
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 14: Tests of robustness using second stage models with different specifications
Model I: Model II: Model III:
Increase in Reduction in Reduction in
physical activity alcohol drinking no. cigarettes
Test A. Allowing for non-linearity:
Change in Disease Control (γ1) 0.14 0.65* 23.46**
(0.39) (0.39) (10.15)
Constant -0.05* 0.02 -0.11
(0.03) (0.03) (0.93)
No. observations 22,467 20,782 2,379
No. individuals 2,249 2,080 238
No. practices 1,505 1,400 248
Test B. Including All CVD indicators:
Change in Disease Control (γ1) -0.27 0.40 28.00**
(0.47) (0.45) (13.20)
Constant -0.04 0.04 0.13
(0.03) (0.03) (0.87)
No. observations 21,244 19,632 2,262
No. individuals 2,135 1,973 227
No. practices 1,410 1,305 235
Statistics weighted by the constructed sampling weights and clustered std. errors in (). Model III on sample of smokers in
2004. Lifestyles increasing in health effort: intensity of physical activity, rarity of alcohol drinking and reduction in
number of cigarettes. Second stage regressions displayed. All models include marital status, whether employed,
household size, wealth and LISI. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 15: Tests of robustness using second stage models with different health behaviours
Test A. Alternative health behaviours Model I: Model II: Model III:
Reduction in Quit No daily
no. cigarettes smoking drinking
Change in Disease Control (γ1) 5.03** 0.33 0.55*
(2.35) (0.29) (0.32)
Constant -0.19 -0.004 -0.01
(0.13) (0.02) (0.02)
No. observations 24,163 2,929 17,393
No. individuals 2,428 293 1,747
No. practices 1,538 293 1,198
Test B. Movers Model I: Model II: Model III:
Increase in Reduction in Reduction in
physical activity alcohol drinking no. cigarettes
Change in Disease Control (γ1) 0.17 0.72* 23.71**
(0.39) (0.40) (10.17)
Mover 0.07 0.08 -2.05
(0.07) (0.07) (2.83)
Constant -0.13 -0.07 1.81
(0.08) (0.08) (2.74)
No. observations 22,467 20,782 2,379
No. individuals 2,249 2,080 238
No. practices 1,505 1,400 248
Statistics weighted by the constructed sampling weights and clustered std. errors in (). Test A: Model I includes former;
smokers Model III excludes never drinkers. Second stage regressions displayed. All models include marital status, whether
employed, household size, wealth and LISI. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 16: Tests of robustness using second stage models with patient heterogeneity
Model I: Model II: Model III:
Increase in Reduction in Reduction in
physical activity alcohol drinking no. cigarettes
Test A. Age:
Change in Disease Control 0.20 0.76 34.79**
(0.55) (0.58) (15.18)
Change in Disease Control for older patients -0.06 -0.09 -27.80
(0.78) (0.80) (18.26)
Older patients -0.09 0.03 1.26
(0.06) (0.06) (1.80)
Constant -0.01 -0.003 -0.64
(0.04) (0.05) (1.42)
No. observations 22,467 20,782 2,379
No. individuals 2,249 2,080 238
No. practices 1,505 1,400 248
Test B.Wealth:
Change in Disease Control 0.05 1.14* 20.95**
(0.60) (0.62) (10.66)
Change in Disease Control for wealthier patients 0.27 -0.81 14.62
(0.78) (0.80) (27.90)
Wealthier patients 0.02 0.08 -1.89
(0.02) (0.06) (0.59)
Constant -0.05 -0.03 0.29
(0.05) (0.05) (1.03)
No. observations 22,436 20,753 2,369
No. individuals 2,249 2,080 238
No. practices 1,497 1,391 246
Statistics weighted by the constructed sampling weights and clustered std. errors in (). Second stage regressions displayed;
All models include marital status, whether employed,
household size, wealth and LISI. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 17: Second stage coefficients of first differenced linear models of mechanisms
Model I: Model II: Model III:
Doctor Smoking Blood pressure
prescription cessation advice check
Change in Disease Control (γ1) 0.44 0.21* -0.03
(0.28) (0.12) (0.20)
Change in non single status -0.03 -0.01 0.004
(0.07) (0.01) (0.08)
Change in employed status 0.03 -0.01 0.03
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Change in household size -0.02 -0.004 0.05
(0.03) (0.003) (0.05)
Change in Ln(equivalised wealth) -0.01 -0.004 0.01
(0.01) (0.003) (0.01)
Change in LISI 0.003 0.003 -0.01**
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
Constant 0.21*** -0.03* 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
No. observations 26,215 2,379 14,006
No. individuals 2,624 238 1,402
No. practices 1,674 248 1,025
Statistics weighted by the constructed sampling weights and clustered std. errors in (). No. observations for the
10 imputed datasets on the sample of people aged 50+ with CVD. Model III on sample of smokers in 2004.
Lifestyles increasing in health effort: intensity of physical activity, rarity of alcohol drinking and reduction
in number of cigarettes. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
If provider altruism is below αU , then the provider is always better off by providing a
∗(α) rather than
a∗∗(α) = a∗(α, p = 0) since, by the envelop theorem, the provider is always better off with a positive price
than with a zero price, ∂EW (y∗, a∗)/∂p = (a∗ − aL) > 0.
If provider altruism is strictly above αU , then effort a
∗(α) is no longer optimal since the price p drops to
zero for any effort above a∗(αU ) = aU . The provider may have an incentive to provide the upper threshold
aU . However, this will be optimal only if provider utility from providing the upper threshold aU is higher
than provider utility when providing a∗∗(α), i.e. the optimal effort in the absence of a positive price. To
compare the two solutions define ∆(α) = EW (yU , aU )−EW (y∗∗, a∗∗(α)) as the difference in provider utility
in the two scenarios. Using the envelop theorem, we obtain
∆(α)
∂α
= [ϕ(yU , aU )− ϕ(y∗∗(α), a∗∗(α))] (H1 −H0) .
This suggests that ∆(α) > 0 if aU > a
∗∗(α), ∆(α) < 0 if aU < a∗∗(α) and ∆(α) = 0 if aU = a∗∗(α). Recall
that we have defined αU as a
∗∗(αU ) = aU . It therefore follows that aU is the optimal solution if α ∈ [αU , αU ]
and a∗∗(α) is the optimal solution if α ∈ (αU , α]. In words, aU is optimal if the optimal effort in the absence
of the price is below the upper threshold.
B Additional results
Table B.1: Sample of practices in England and ELSA by threshold levels for Disease Control
England: ELSA/Practice linkage
LT (LT, UT) UT Total LT (LT, UT) UT Total
2004/05 3 2,675 5,609 8,287 1 666 1,978 2,645
(0.04%) (32.28%) (67.68%) (0.04%) (25.18%) (74.82%)
2006/07 1 2,077 6,279 8,357 0 429 2,093 2,522
(0.01%) (24.85%) (75.13%) (0.00%) (17.00%) (83.01%)
Note: Statistics weighted by the constructed sampling weights LT=Upper Threshold level and UT=Lower
Threshold level; (LT, UT) between lower and upper threshold. Achievements from ELSA practices are calculated
on the sample of individuals 50+. Proportion of total sample in ().
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Table B.2: Summary statistics on the points weighted average achievement rates and potential revenue change
(England)
Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev.
Disease Control [a04] 0.76 (8,287) 0.004 1 0.09
Disease Control [a06] 0.83 (8,357) 0.08 1 0.06
Potential Revenue change [∆R] 0.06 (8,055) 0 0.40 0.08
Note: Statistics weighted by the constructed sampling weights. Sample sizes in () represent practices.
C Data Linkage
We use the list of practices from the National Health Service Quality Management and Analysis System
(QMAS) database available at http://www.gpcontract.co.uk/download for which we have information on
the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF). There are 8,287 practice in 2004, 8,357 in 2006 and 8,229 in
2008. The original sample of ELSA respondents contained 9,432 and 9,805 respondents in the second and
third wave, respectively, and over 11,000 in the fourth wave (see Table C.1). An anonymised list of ELSA
respondents with the practice name, postcode and addresses was obtained by NatCen. From this data we
have 7,332 respondents (out of the original 7,666 respondents) in wave 2 and 8,138 (out of the original 8,643
respondents) in wave 4 (the waves with nurse visits).
Table C.1: ELSA-GP practices linkage samples
Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4
(2004/05) (2006/07) (2008/09)
Total no. practices in QMAS data 8,287 8,357 8,229
Original ELSA sample:
No. respondents 9,432 9,805 11,050
Respondents at nurse visit 7,666 N/A 8,643
Respondents in ELSA-practices data 7,332 N/A 8,138
Respondents after imputation 9,432 9,168 11,050
Respondents with matched GP address 7,694 6,680 8,828
Respondents with uniquely matched GP address 7,232 6,313 8,356
Respondents with multiple matched GP addresses 462 367 472
Respondents with un-matched GP address 1,738 2,488 2,222
ELSA sample of CVD patients:
Practices matched to ELSA respondents 2,766 2,584 3,131
Practices uniquely matched to ELSA respondents 2,620 2,439 2,967
Multiple practices matched to ELSA respondents 146 145 164
Respondents per practice:
Mean 1.12 1.08 1.10
Std. Dev. 0.77 0.57 0.71
Min. 1 1 1
Max. 13 13 16
Note: weighted statistics.
We then define the following mapping programme. First, we adopt exact matching of practices by their
postcode. When the latter is missing, we use a fuzzy matching code that matches the strings of practice
addresses and names in the ELSA data to the ones in the QMAS database. Imputation of practices that are
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missing for ELSA respondents is performed in two stages. At the first stage, we impute missing practices
for ELSA respondent i by using the practice the partner of i’s respondent is registered with. At the second
stage, we impute missing practices from the ones available for respondent i in the previous or subsequent
waves. As a result, out of the original sample of respondents from waves 2 and 4, we identify 9,168 of
respondents in wave 3 who were present both in wave 2 and 4 and did not change practice. We need to
impute this sample in wave 3 from the nurse visits in waves 2 and 4, because it was in 2006 that the change
in the incentive scheme occurred. The combined two-stages approach allows us to match more individuals
than the ones originally given us by NatCen. We match the practice address for 7,694 respondents in wave
2 (against the original 7,332 sample), 8,828 respondents in wave 4 (against the original 8,643 sample), and
6,680 respondents in wave 3 (against the original missing sample because it was not in the nurse visit).
Multiple practices are matched to individuals with incomplete postcode or address: 462 and 472 in waves 2
and 4, respectively, and 367 in wave 3.
There are 4,124 ELSA respondents with CVD in the second wave, 3,071 in the third wave and 3,028
in the fourth wave. Using the matched ELSA-practice sample, we have 2,766 and 2,584 matched ELSA
respondents with CVD in wave 2 and 3, respectively, and 3,131 in wave 4. Of these samples about 146 were
matched to multiple practices in wave 2, 145 in wave 3 and 164 in wave 4.
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